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JAPANESE TEXTILES: SOME LEGAL





"In all of the complex of cross-currents of economic and political
forces that must be dealt with in the establishment of a sound foreign
economic policy for this country, there is no single problem that is more
baffling and yet more urgent than that of what to do about Japan."1 So
spoke the chairman of the President's Commission on Foreign Economic
Policy in 1954. Three years later the problem is no closer to solution
and is still as urgent as it was. The latest chapter in the history of
Japanese-American commercial relations is being written today in a con-
troversy which involves important problems cutting across law and
policy.
For many years the question of what to do about imports of Japanese
manufactured goods into the United States has been a source of serious
concern. Periodically, a cry has gone up against "cheap goods manu-
factured by low-wage labor." World War II and the post-war occupa-
tion years stilled the clamor for a time, but promulgation of the com-
mercial treaty between the United States and Japan in 1953 has provided
a springboard for more outcries. 2 The context today is the Southeastern
United States where in two states, Alabama and South Carolina, legisla-
tion has been enacted directed toward Japanese textile imports.3 In
turn, a recent announcement by the federal government discloses that
Japan will "voluntarily" limit its exports of textiles to the United States
to 235 million square yards annually.
4
Two important legal questions are involved in this context, questions
which exist in the penumbra where constitutional law and international
law meet. In the first place, the validity of the state statutes can be ques-
tioned. Specifically, are these statutes invalid as being in contravention
* Associate Professor of Law, Emory University.
I RANDALL, A FOREIGN ECONOMIC POLICY FOR THE UNITED STATES 55 (1954).
-This is the Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation between the
United States of America and Japan, effective October 30, 1953, T.I.A.S. No. 2863.
' So. Car. Code § 66-8 (Supp. 1956); Ala. Sess. Laws 1956, No. 120, § 46.
Georgia's legislature considered but rejected similar legislation in its 1957 session.
' The announcement took the form of a press release dated January 16, 1957,
issued by the Departments of State, Commerce, and Agriculture. See N. Y. Times,
Feb. 10, 1957, § F, p. 1, for a discussion of the Japanese program.
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of the 1953 treaty with Japan? Are they a regulation of foreign com-
merce which might fall as being in conflict with the power of Congress
to regulate both interstate and foreign commerce? And in the second
place, the legal nature of the agreement of export limitation, and the
power of the executive branch to arrange for it, is open to conjecture and
question. What form did the arrangement take? Was it an executive
agreement? If so, had it been authorized by Congress? Did it need
prior congressional authorization? These questions are of importance
both in American external relations and domestically: externally, for it
may well be that the United States will be violating the treaty (and thus
be in violation of international law) and yet be unable, because of its
municipal constitutional structure, to do anything about it; domestically,
because the questions throw in sharp focus the important constitutional
issues posed by the perennial efforts to enact the so-called Bricker
Amendment.5
STATUTE VERSUS TREATY
Validity of the state statutes of Alabama and South Carolina depends
in the first instance on whether their terms are inconsistent with the 1953
Japanese-American treaty. Since 1797 it has been clear that state laws
must give way before the terms of a treaty;G this doctrine of course
merely articulates in the courts what the Constitution itself makes ex-
press.'
Both of the statutes require the same thing. Merchants must post
signs informing the public that they sell Japanese textiles, with provisions
made for criminal penalties for violations. South Carolina's has been
codified in the following terms:
§ 66-8: Sellers of Japanese textiles to display sign to that
effect. Every person operating a wholesale or retail establishment
in the State which sells Japanese textile goods, or garments made
therefrom, shall display in a conspicuous place upon the doors of
such establishment, in letters not less than four inches high, a sign
reading as follows: "Japanese Textiles Sold Here." Any person
violating the provisions of this section shall be guilty of a mis-
demeanor and upon conviction thereof shall be fined not more than
The latest of the efforts of the indefatigable Senator Bricker came in early
1957 when he introduced S. J. Res. 3, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. (1957). Under this
version, Senator Bricker has seemed to revert back to the substance of his initial
effort.
' Ware v. Hylton, 3 U. S. (3 Dallas) 199 (1797).
'Article VI of the U. S. CONSTTiON reads in part as follows: "This Consti-
tution, and the laws of the United States which shall be made in pursuance thereof;
and all treaties made, or which shall be made, under the authority of the United
States, shall be the supreme law of the land; an the judges in every State shall be




one hundred dollars or imprisoned for not more than thirty days.8
The treaty is rather lengthy, but the sections which might be con-
sidered to deal with the same subject matter as the South Carolina law
are the following:
ARTICLE XV
1. Each Party shall promptly publish laws, regulations and
administrative rulings of general application pertaining to . .. re-
quirements and restrictions on imports and exports, or affecting
their sale, distribution or use; and shall administer such laws,
regulations and rulings in a uniform, impartial and reasonable
manner.
ARTICLE XVI
1. Products of either Party shall be accorded, within the terri-
tories of the other Party, national treatment and most-favored-
nation treatment in all matters affecting internal taxation, sale,
distribution, storage, and use.
ARTICLE XXII
1. The term "national treatment" means treatment accorded
within the territories of a Party upon terms no less favorable than
the treatment accorded therein, in like situations, to nationals,
companies, products, vessels or other objects, as the case may be,
of such Party.'
Two questions must be answered before a determination of validity
of the statute under the treaty can be made: (1) Is the treaty self-exe-
cuting? (2) If so, is it inconsistent with the statute? Under existing
constitutional interpretation, a treaty may be formally binding interna-
tionally but it does not become the "Law of the Land," i.e., municipal law,
under Article VI of the Constitution unless it is self-executing. The
test for determining whether a treaty is self-executing was early set out
by Chief Justice John Marshall in Foster v. Neilson :10 a treaty requires
subsequent congressional action, that is to say, is not self-executing,
* . when the terms of the stipulation import a contract-when either
of the parties engages to perform a particular act ... ." If it is so found,
8 So. Car. Code, § 66-8 (Supp. 1956).
' Japanese-American Treaty, supra note 2.
1027 U. S. (2 Peters) 253, 314 (1829). In the Head Money Cases, 112 U. S.
589, 598 (1884), Justice Miller said: "A treaty is primarily a compact between
independent nations. It depends for the enforcement of its provisions on the interest
and honor of the governments which are parties to it. ... But a treaty may also
contain provisions which confer certain rights upon the citizens or subjects of one
of the nations residing in the territorial limits of the other, which partake of the
nature of municipal law, and which are capable of enforcement as between private
parties in the courts of the country."
1957]
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then the treaty is not the "Law of the Land" unless and until Congress
acts to make it so. Here, it would appear that Article XV of the
Japanese-American treaty requires subsequent legislative action, for it
calls for each party promptly publishing "laws, regulations and admin-
istrative rulings . . . pertaining to . . . requirements and restrictions on
imports and exports, or affecting their sale, distribution or iese .... "
(Emphasis added.) On the other hand, Article XVI seems to be self-
executing; it calls for "national treatment" for the products of the other
nation in all matters including sale, distribution and use. No require-
ment for legislative action is indicated. Thus, it would seem that part of
the treaty is self-executing, and part not.
If it is assumed, for purposes of exposition, that the treaty is self-
executing, then the question of the validity of South Carolina's law turns
on the issue of whether it affords "national treatment" to the products of
Japan. And national treatment, by definition, means the treatment
which South Carolina must give to the products manufactured in other
states of the United States. The law requiring the posting of signs would
seem to be an obvious instance of discrimination, and hence, would be
invalid if directed at, say, textiles produced in Massachusetts."1 Ac-
cordingly, national treatment means treatment without discrimination.
The South Carolina (and Alabama, since it is identical) law, thus, would
be invalid as being in contravention of the treaty. An independent
ground, not involving the treaty, for possibly invalidating the laws is
the so-called negative implication of the commerce clause in the Consti-
tution.1
2
" The commerce clause of the Constitution was directed, among other things,
toward the chaotic conditions of restriction and discrimination existing under the
Articles of Confederation. The steady flow of Supreme Court doctrine has been
in the direction of preventing the "Balkanization" of the American economy. See,
e.g., Hood & Sons v. DuMond, 336 U. S. 525 (1949).
" States may not discriminate against interstate commerce, the justification
being, in the words of Justice Cardozo, that the Constitution "was framed upon
the theory that the peoples of the several states must sink or swim together, and
that in the long run prosperity and salvation are in union and not division." Fur-
ther, that "neither the power to tax nor the police power may be used by the state
of destination with the aim and effect of estgblishing an economic barrier against
competition with the products of another state or the labor of its residents ...
What is ultimate is the principle that one state in its dealing with another may not
place itself in a position of economic isolation." Baldwin v. G. A. F. Seelig, Inc.,
294 U. S. 511, 523, 527 (1935).
But obviously these same underlying, fundamental policy considerations are not
present when the commerce in question is "foreign" as distinguished from "inter-
state." It would not lead to "Balkanization" of the American economy for a
state in the United States to attempt to inhibit the sale of foreign-made goods.
But it would conflict with the national purpose, the purpose of Congress as ex-
pressed in the treaty, and would be in derogation of American international responsi-
bilities. And even if it is argued that Congress has not legislated and has not ex-
pressed a policy, nevertheless the subject matter under question here would appear
to fall within the proscriptions of the doctrine of the Cooley case; that is to say,
[Vol. 35
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Suppose, however, that no one in either South Carolina or Alabama
disobeys the statutory mandate. No one then would arise to challenge
the validity of the laws when under trial for the violation. Could any-
thing be done about the matter? Under the Constitution, could anyone
in the federal government contest the statutes? This question became
pertinent in early 1957 when Secretary of State John Foster Dulles
announced that he had asked the Department of Justice to test the legality
of the state laws.13 There appears, however, to be no way for the At-
torney General to do this. The Supreme Court has power to decide only
"cases" and "controversies" and does not render advisory opinions.
Other than a merchant alleged to be in violation of the state laws there
does not appear to be anyone who can fulfill the case or controversy
jurisdictional requisite. Certainly the federal government, its officials or
agencies, does not have a general right to test the legality of state laws.
14
It could well be, accordingly, that a situation which was true under the
Articles of Confederation is, despite the language of Article VI of the
Constitution, also true today.15
The upshot would be that the United States would be in the em-
barrassing position of being in violation of international law for failing
to live up to a treaty obligation while at the same time being unable to do
anything about it. This is essentially the position in which the United
States finds itself today. Even outside the grave policy questions in-
volved, this is hardly a desirable posture for this country to hold with
regard to our external relations. It is not likely to win many friends
for the United States among the other nations of the world. But it seems
to be an oft-times unavoidable result of the the American system of
federalism, a system which operates to insulate a great deal of the activi-
ties of Americans generally from the reach of the central governmental
this is a subject matter which "imperatively demands a single uniform rule through-
out the nation." See Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 53 U. S. (12 Howard) 299
(1851). Cf. Brown v. Maryland, 25 U. S. (12 Wheaton) 419 (1827).
"a The announcement came in a press conference held by the Secretary of State
on March 5, 1957. The Department of Justice, when queried about the request
from Dulles, replied that the question is still under study.
The following statement by Representative Hale Boggs of Louisiana may be
found at 103 Congressional Record 3187 (March 13, 1957) : "In the spring of 1956
the States of South Carolina and Alabama passed legislation requiring the posting
of signs in retail stores selling Japanese textile products. The Secretary of State
publicly deplored these enactmbnts. He pointed out that these laws appeared to be
contrary to the treaty of friendship, commerce and navigation between the United
States and Japan which had been ratified by the Senate."
"In addition, it would be of doubtful political feasibility.
"One of the chief reasons for calling the Constitutional Convention of 1787 was
the inability of the Continental Congress under the Articles of Confederation to
compel state governments to comply with treaty obligations of the United States.
See 1 FARRAND, THE REcoRs OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION 164, 316 (1937) ; 3 id.
113, 548. It was one of the treaty problems which culminated in the litigation
resulting in Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U. S. (1 Wheaton) 304 (1816), one of
the key cases in constitutional history.
1957]
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power. And it would seem to be clear beyond doubt that the United
States could not invoke its municipal law or Constitution in order to be
relieved from its international obligation. "Unless otherwise provided
in the treaty itself, a State cannot justify its failure to perform its obliga-
tions under a treaty because of any provisions or omissions in its mu-
nicipal law, or because of any special features of its governmental organi-
zation or its constitutional system." 10
This situation points up what often is the great difficulty of conduct-
ing international relations in a federal system and in a nation where
sectional interests can, through the pull and tug of normal politics, often
prevail over what would be a different position had the Secretary of State
a free hand. The position is undesirable. A nation, particularly one of
the present stature of the United States, can ill afford to have its ex-
ternal posture undercut by parochial domestic politics. As Walter
Lippmann has pointed out, the public interest must prevail.17 This is
a problem which, under the Constitution, has not been resolved even.
though experience under the Articles of Confederation with treaties and
state laws was one of the principal reasons for calling the Constitutional
Convention.' 8 It is a problem which could well occur with increasing
frequency in the future, as American concern with and commitment in
the world political process becomes more and more intensive and ex-
tensive. In the past, the United States, as with the League of Nations,
has been placed in the awkward position of making promises and then
having to break them because of the exigencies of domestic politics. It
may well have been for this reason-the fact that other nations know
that the President's word in international affairs cannot always be taken
at face value because he may be "vetoed" by Congress or some fact of
American politics-that President Eisenhower, in promulgating the
"Eisenhower Doctrine" for the Middle East, chose to ask Congress for
military authority he already had under the Constitution. This prob-
lem of authority to speak for the United States in its foreign relations is
also involved in the Japanese textile situation and will be taken up below.
Dealing as it does with matters which are primarily local, some ques-
tion may be raised about the validity of the treaty. However, the de-
cision in Missouri v. Holland"' doubtless would govern the matter and
the treaty would be upheld as a proper exercise of federal power; the
Tenth Amendment, in other words, would not operate to strike down
the treaty. Furthermore, under present-day interpretation of congres-
sional power under the commerce clause, it would seem that Congress
"Harvard Research in International Law, 29 Am. J. INT'L LAW SupP. 1029-
1044 (1935).
See LIPPMANN, THE PUBLIC PHILOSOPHY passin (1955).
"See note 15 supra.
"252 U. S. 416 (1920).
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does have power to deal with the same local matters dealt with in the
treaty.20  If that be true, then Congress could legislate and make such
practices as are required by the South Carolina law illegal by federal
statute. Certainly, if the commerce clause cannot be stretched that far,
Congress would have power to do so by terms of the treaty. Even so,
this would not alter the situation noted above: Unless and until some
merchant violated the statute, no case or controversy would be present
so as to give the federal courts jurisdiction to decide the question of
legality. Moreover, it probably would be politically impossible or in-
feasible for the executive branch of the national government to attempt to
get such legislation through Congress. Easily bruised feelings of parochial
pride, as well as the laments of constituents, could well rise in strong
opposition among members of the powerful Southern delegations in Con-
gress.
The problem of executive-legislative relations in the conduct of
American foreign affairs is one of long-simmering controversy. Periodi-
cally it erupts, the latest example being in the battle over the Bricker
Amendment. Furthermore, the Japanese textile situation itself has pre-
cipitated another skirmish in the pull-and-tug between Congress and the
President.
THn, AGREEMENT OF LIMITATION
In January 1957 a press release issued jointly by the Departments of
State, Commerce, and Agriculture announced the Japanese program for
control of exports of cotton textiles to the United States.2 ' An annual
over-all ceiling of 235 million square yards of all types of Japanese cotton
cloth and cotton manufactures was instituted, beginning in January 1957.
Apparently the limitation was the result of a series of discussions and
notes between representatives of the two governments. However, it is
not entirely clear whether an international agreement was concluded or
what the federal departments considered their legal authority to be to
arrange such an agreement of limitation. The State Department, how-
ever, takes the position that the Japanese action was entirely unilateral
and that the question of federal authority is, therefore, irrelevant.
22
"0 The principle which will validate congressional regulation of the sale of bottles
on the shelves of the local drugstore would seem to be broad enough to cover the
situation of the sale of Japanese textiles, even in the absence of any treaty obliga-
tion. See United States v. Sullivan, 332 U. S. 689 (1948). Cf. Wickard v. Filburn,
317 U. S. 111 (1942) ; United States v. Darby, 312 U. S. 100 (1941).
21 See note 4, supra. In the press release, the Departments of State, Commerce,
and Agriculture made a joint statement, including the following: "The action
taken by Japan is a major step forward in the development of orderly and mutually
beneficial trade between the United States and Japan. It is a constructive measure
aimed at forstalling possible future injury to the United States cotton textile
industry. It recognizes the problem faced by various segments of the domestic
industry and meets this problem through the voluntary exercise of restraint on
exports of cotton textiles to the American market."
2 A request by letter was addressed to the State Department on March I,
1957, asking the following questions: "(a) Were the discussions between the United
1957]
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An immediate reaction took place in Congress. Representative
Henderson Lanham of Georgia introduced a resolution calling for an in-
vestigation of the Japanese program "for the purpose of determining
whether or to what extent the authority of the Congress to regulate the
foreign commerce of the United States has been usurped, disregarded
or misused by the executive branch of this Government in entering into
the arrangement with Japan. .... -23 Thrown, thus, into sharp focus was
the as yet unsettled scope of authority of the President and the executive
branch to conclude international agreements other than treaties.
Although the Constitution is silent as to their use, in fact executive
States Government Departments with representatives of the Japanese Government
formalized in a document? (b) If no formal document was drawn up, was a series
of notes exchanged with the Japanese Government? (c) Was the action of the
Japanese Government entirely unilateral? (d) What does the State Department
consider to be the legal authority for entering this type of program ?"
By letter dated May 9, 1957, the Chief, Public Services Division, Department
of State, replied as follows:
"The discussions between representatives of the United States Government
and the Japanese Government were not formalized in a document. The Japanese
Government issued a paper which provided the details of its program for the control
of cotton textile exports to the United States ...
"The action taken by the Japanese was transmitted in a note from the Japanese
Government on January 16, 1957. At the request of the Japanese Government this
note has not been released publicly. The United States merely acknowledged
the receipt of the Japanese note.
"The action of the Japanese Government was entirely unilateral. In view of
the unilateral nature of the action taken by the Japanese the question of legal
authority on the part of the United States is not relevant. This question would
arise only if a bilateral arrangement had been entered into."
It is not believed that this letter satisfactorily explains the legal basis for the
action. Technically, of course, the Japanese action was unilateral, but it was a
bilateral arrangement if one looks not to the Japanese note alone, but to the total
context out of which it arose.
The executive agreement in the Capps case, infra note 31, is in the form of an
exchange of notes between the United States and Canada. These notes are printed
as an appendix to the Capps case in the Supreme Court Reporter. See United
States v. Guy W. Capps, Inc., 348 U. S. 296 (1955).
" This is Congressional Record, H. Res. 145, 85th Cong., 1st Sess., CONG. REc.
1340-45 (daily ed. Feb. 4, 1957). An inquiry by the present writer to Representa-
tive Lanham as to what action had been taken under H. Res. 145 brought a reply
which read in part as follows: "There was put into the [Congressional] Record by
Congressman Hale Boggs of Louisiana a brief statement of the so-called agreement
by Japan to limit exports of textiles to the United States. The Department of
Commerce sent one of the Under Secretaries over to explain how the arrangement
was worked out. For these reasons, I have not pushed for action on the resolu-
tion." Letter dated May 8, 1957, from Representative Henderson Lanham to the
present writer.
The statement by Representative Boggs may be found at 103 Congressional
Record 3185-88 (March 13, 1957). Of particular interest is a quotation from
a note from the Japanese government to the United States dated September 27,
1956: "The action [the agreement to limit exports] now contemplated by Japan
is based on the condition that all feasible steps will be taken by the United States
Government to solve the problem of discriminatory State textile legislation and
to prevent further restrictive action with regard to the importation of Japanese
textiles into the United States." Ibid., at 3187.
[Vol. 35
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agreements have been negotiated and entered into throughout American
history. Most of them are made pursuant to some legislative enactment;
they represent the products of a cooperative endeavor by executive and
legislature. Relatively little litigation has developed over either the legal
effect of executive and other agreements or the respective powers of the
two branches of government. The problems involved in such matters
seldom involve justiciable issues and seldom end up in litigation. It was
not until 1951 that a judicial decision was reached on the question of
whether an executive agreement could supersede a prior inconsistent
federal statute. The result of this ,paucity of cases is that what consti-
tutional law as does exist consists mainly of some broad pronouncements
made in a few recent Supreme Court opinions. These cases, notably
United States v. Pink,24 United States v. Belmont,2 5 and United States
v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp.,26 are ones in which the Court painted
with a broad brush, leaving a number of murky areas. One of these
is the power of the President to conclude an agreement involving a sub-
ject matter on which Congress has express authority under the Constitu-
tion to legislate. This is the broad situation in the Japanese agreement of
limitation: Congress has constitutional power to regulate foreign and
interstate commerce; what, then, may the President do in the field of
foreign commerce? Does he, because he is the sole organ of our govern-
ment in the conduct of American external relations, possess an independ-
ent power co-equal or superior to that of Congress?
The powers of the executive under the Constitution have never been
spelled out with precision, either in the basic document itself or in
Supreme Court interpretation.2 7  This is particularly true of his powers
as Commander in Chief of the armed forces and also as the American
spokesman in foreign relations. As a recent commentator has put it, "The
scope of the President's power to conclude international agreements
has ...never been clearly defined, and can only be indicated approxi-
mately by an estimate of the requirements of modern international rela-
tions guided by the various exercises of presidential power which have
been recognized as constitutional during the course of our history."28
24315 U. S. 203 (1942).
S301 U. S. 324 (1937).
28299 U. S. 304 (1936). See also Altman & Co. v. United States, 224 U. S.
583 (1912).2, This is but another way of saying that the office of the presidency is one in
which the job-the exigencies facing each President--creates its own special re-
quirements which are met by the President, not on the basis of legal prescription,
but on broad policy considerations. The matters dealt with by the President are
normally nonjusticiable and answer cannot be delineated in advance. When a
particular matter does get to court, the tendency for the judiciary is to avoid
making a decision. See SCHUBERT, THE PRESIDENCY IN TE CoURTs passim
(1957).
28 Mathews, The Constitutional Power of the President to Conclude International
Agreements, 64 YALE L. J. 345, 379 (1955).
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Justice Sutherland's statement in the Curtiss-Wright case, that "the in-
vestment of the federal government with the powers of external sov-
ereignty did not depend upon the affirmative grants of the Constitu-
tion," ' does not clarify the question of the President's power vis-A-vis
Congress. What can be said, in the absence of definitive Court state-
ment, is that the constitutional prescription is one for shared power.
The President may be the sole organ of government for external affairs,
but he cannot effectively pursue policies unless Congress is willing to
appropriate funds; he can commit American troops as Commander in
Chief, but first Congress must "raise and support" them; and so on.
Normally, few controversies arise because of this power-sharing, it
having been found politically expedient to cooperate closely. In addition
to shared power, there is doubtless an overlap of power, but it is an
overlap which has not yet been given exact definition. "The great
ordinances of the Constitution," Justice Holmes once observed, "do not
establish and divide fields of black and white."' 0 For better or for worse,
the President and Congress have a dual responsibility in foreign affairs.
Cooperation has been the rule; conflict, while it has taken place, has
been rare.
Only two cases, both of very recent vintage, have dealt directly with
the question of which branch of the federal government, President or
Congress, prevails in the event of conflict. Both, moreover, are decisions
of lower federal courts. In United States v. Guy W. Capps, Inc.,31 the
Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals had before it a situation where an
executive agreement had been concluded with Canada which was in-
consistent with a prior congressional statute. Meeting the constitutional
issue squarely, the court held the agreement void as a matter of municipal
law because it was not authorized by Congress and contravened a prior
act of Congress. 32  The Supreme Court, however', chose to dodge the
constitutional question and decided the case on other grounds; in so
doing, the highest Court expressly repudiated the Circuit Court's hold-
ing.33  In 1955, the Court of Claims decided Seery v. United States,84
a case which, if it ever reaches the Supreme Court, could settle a number
of constitutional questions in addition to the respective priorities of Presi-
dent and Congress. There, the question arose as to whether an Ameri-
29299 U. S. 304, at 318.
"Springer v. Philippine Islands, 277 U. S. 189, 209 (1928) (dissenting opinion).
21204 F. 2d 655 (4th Cir. '1953), affirmed on other grounds, 348 U. S. 296
(1955). See Sutherland, The Bricker Amendment, Executive Agreements, and
Imported Potatoes, 67 HARv. L. REv. 281 (1953).
3249 STAT. 773 (1935), 7 U. S. C. § 624 (1952).
"In view of the foregoing, there is no occasion for us to consider the other
questions discussed by the Court of Appeals. The decision in this case does not rest
upon them." 348 U. S. at 305.
" 127 F. Supp. 601 (Ct. Cl. 1955). See Sutherland, The Flag, The Constitution,
and International Agreements, 68 HARv. L. Rav. 1374 (1955).
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can whose property, located in Austria, had been confiscated by the Army
after the war, could bring suit against the federal government under the
Tucker Act.35 In 1947, an executive agreement had been concluded
with Austria in full settlement of all obligations. The government argued
that this agreement acted to extinguish not only the plaintiff's consti-
tutional rights which might have been available but also that part of the
Tucker Act which had consented to suit. The Court of Claims gave
short shrift to this argument, stating: "It would indeed be incongruous
if the Executive Department alone, without even the limited participation
by Congress which is present when a treaty is ratified, could not only
nullify the Act of Congress consenting to suit on Constitutional claims,
but, by nullifying that Act of Congress, destroy the Constitutional rights
of a citizen."'36 Capps and Seery, taken together, are too little authority
on which to build doctrine, but they do display a rather significant
tendency on the part of the judiciary to view with extreme caution
assertions of the unfettered power of the President to conclude executive
agreements when those agreements have a direct effect on American
citizens. Furthermore, the cases do indicate a tendency to interdict the
President when his executive agreements run into conflict with powers
of Congress, as compared with the relatively free hand accorded him
when the conflict is with state law.
Absence of authoritative statement from the judiciary leaves the
technical constitutional situation clouded in doubt. It may be that more
litigation will take place in the future, as the United States becomes even
more immersed in international affairs. "In international legal affairs
perhaps the most prominent development of the twentieth century has
been the amazing number, complexity and variety of international agree-
ments."37 That being so, perhaps the next few years will bring resolu-
tion of some of the present problem areas. But even without definitive
doctrine, a number of statements can be made about the Japanese agree-
ment of self-limitation.
First, the agreement of course operates as an international consensual
obligation and thus binds the Japanese government under well-known
doctrines of international law.38  Of course, operating as a powerful
" 62 STAT. 940 (1948), 28 U. S. C. § 1491 (1952). It is worth mentioning,
perhaps, that the commentators have been generally critical of the Seery decision.
See Oliver, Executive Agreements and Emanations from the Fifth Amendment,
49 Ami. J. INT'L L. 362 (1955); Note, 43 CALIF. L. REv. 525 (1955). In Note,
55 COLUm. L. REv. 926 (1955)_ the decision is criticized because it "hampers the
executive's ability to make final settlement of claims," a criticism which at best begs
the real questions in the case and which at worst pays far too much obeisance to
the concept of efficiency, as distinguished from fairness, in government.
" Seery v. United States, 127 F. Supp. 601, 607 (Ct. Cl. 1955).
" BISHOP, Foreword to HENDRY, TREATIES AND FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONS iii
(1955)." See BRIGGs, THE LAW OF NATIONS 836 (2d ed. 1952).
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sanction behind that obligation is the fact that the United States can ct
off imports of Japanese textiles whenever it wishes. This would be done
through the normal use of import quotas and control over imports. But
it would probably have to be done by Congress. The other side of the
coin is the fact that Japan can take retaliatory action against goods being
imported by that nation from the United States.
Second, it is possible that a statutory basis for the "agreement" exists
in a section of the Agriculture Act, the same section which was involved
in the Capps case. Under this section, the President has authority to
place limitations on imports when he finds that they will "render or tend
to render ineffective, or materially interfere with, any program or opera-
tion undertaken" under the Agriculture Act and similar statutes.30 The
Act applies to agricultural commodities and also to products processed
from such commodities. But if this is relied upon as a source of presi-
dential authority, it is scarcely tenable for the reason that the President
has not followed the statutory procedure. Furthermore, the same sec-
tion of the Act goes on to say that "No trade agreement or other interna-
tional agreement heretofore or hereafter entered into by the United
States shall be applied in a manner inconsistent with the requirements
of this section. '40 Although it may well be that no litigant can or will
arise to challenge the validity of the agreement of limitation, it would
seem fairly certain that the Agriculture Act does not give congressional
authority for the agreement.
Third, if the statutory basis for the agreement is nonexistent, is there
any other possible legal hook on which it could be hung? Does the
President possess independent, i.e., "inherent," authority to conclude
such an arrangement? Can he act in the teeth of an Act of Congress
which appears to be contrary to his method of operation? That the
President does have authority as President to enter into international
executive agreements (that is, presidential agreements as distinguished
from congressional-executive agreements) is obvious. He has exercised
that authority numerous times. For example, the Litvinov Assignment,
the executive agreement at issue in the Pink case, had no statutory
warrant. 41 Whether, however, he has it when the agreement is con-
cerned -with a subject matter on which Congress has express authority to
legislate, and has legislated, is an entirely different matter. That ques-
tion, while unsettled, would seem to call for an answer that the Presi-
dent's authority is doubtful at best. As the late Justice Jackson said in
his concurring opinion in the Steel Seizure case, "When the President
8949 STAT. 773 (1935), 7 U. S. C. § 624 (1952).
'0 Id. § (f).




takes measures incompatible with the expressed or implied will of Con-
gress, his power is at its lowest ebb, for then he can rely only upon his
own constitutional powers minus any constitutional powers of Congress
over the matter.... Presidential claim to [such] a power.., must be
scrutinized with caution, for what is at stake is the equilibrium established
by our constitutional system. '42 However, the Steel Seizure case in-
volved domestic affairs and relative powers over domestic matters, while
here the conflict is one between the power of Congress to regulate
foreign commerce and the power of the President as sole organ of the
government for external affairs. He is not the "messenger boy" of Con-
gress in American foreign relations; he is at least co-equal and perhaps
superior in power. "Any meaningful answer to the problem of the scope
of the President's agreement power must be framed in terms of the
necessities of national survival in the modern world." 43 The problem
is one only incidentally "legal." As with all constitutional questions,
large considerations of policy are involved--of what should be good na-
tional policy in the atomic age. The dilemma-and dilemma it is-is
basic: On the one hand, the President should have unfettered power in
the delicate day-by-day relations with the other nations; on the other, the
whole spirit of our history and legal system is against unfettered power
residing in any one organ of government.
Finally, if the position of the State Department is adopted and the
agreement is viewed as being purely "unilateral" in nature, the question
may still be raised as to legal authority. When the total factual situation
is taken into consideration, it is readily perceivable that the limitation on
foreign commerce came about at the instance of the executive branch of
the federal government. It is, therefore, a clear intervention by the
executive into the regulation of foreign commerce, a power given by the
Constitution only to Congress.
THE FUNDAMENTAL ISSUE
At stake in the factual situation of Japanese textiles is more than
legalism and abstract arguments over constitutional powers, whether
federal or state, presidential or congressional. The effective conduct of
American foreign relations is at issue. As the commitment of the United
States in foreign affairs becomes more intensive as well as more ex-
tensive, this type of situation-where sectional interests operate to handi-
cap the conduct of external relations--can be expected to arise with
increasing frequency. This means that not only will the international
posture of the United States be affected, for better or worse, as new
conflicts take place, but also the internal constitutional structure will
'2 Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U. S. 579, 637, 638 (1952).
"Mathews, supra note 28, at 374.
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undergo searching re-examination. This is a situation which is fraught
with danger, one which without much exaggeration could well become
the Achilles Heel of American democracy.44 Unless the responsible
leaders of American government are allowed to exercise their seasoned
judgment on proper policy and to follow through with measures exe-
cuting that policy, the international position of the United States could
-will--deteriorate. Japan, to take the specific instance here, must
trade-or die. Trade she will-if not with this country, then with
others. And those others include Red China and Soviet Russia.45 That
is the size of the dilemma facing the United States. That is the problem
which makes resort to legalisms by parochial interests seem petty, short-
sighted, and dangerous.
This is, it should be emphasized, a situation which calls for a national
effort to help make a reasonable adjustment to problems raised when
foreign competition becomes significant. The local industry and com-
munity should not be required to bear the full brunt of that competition.
It is true that, as the Commission on Foreign Economic Policy said in
1954, "our foreign policy is aimed basically at improving the security
and the well-being of the United States. Our foreign trade policy is an
adjunct of our total foreign policy; its objectives are those of the total
policy.' ' 48 But if that be true-if foreign policy is for the national well-
being-then internal adjustments necessary because of the operation of
that policy should be shouldered nationally. The Commission on For-
eign Economic Policy considered this problem, but decided not to recom-
mend any positive action by the federal governmnent, because they felt
that dislocations because of tariff reductions and foreign competition was
"but one phase of a much broader problem" and that "it was not appro-
priate to propose such a plan in the tariff area only."' 47 However, one
member of the Commission, David J. McDonald, stated his view that
the federal government should take the lead in helping make adjustments.
"" See LIPPMANN, THE PUBLIC PHILOSOPHY passinm (1955) ; ROPxE, THE SOCIAL
CRISIS OF OUR TIME (1950).
"' See, Cohn, Southern Cotton and Japan, ATLANTIC MONTHLY 55 (August
1956).
The facts of Japan's problem need not be iterated here, other than to sum them
up in Cohn's words by saying that "Japan has too many people, too little land, too
few resources." She has 90 million people existing in a land area less than that of
Montana.
It is vital to the security of the United States that Japan not join the Soviet
orbit. That would be a disaster. "The paramount aim of the Communist effort is to
detach Japan from the United States, then to neutralize her and eventually win her
to the Communist camp. Thus our situation is closely analogous to that of West
Germany. The fate of Europe will be decided by the disposition of the German
question; the destiny of Asia will depend upon the orientation of Japan." Toshikazu
Kase, Japan's New Role in East Asia, 34 FOREIGN AFF. 40, 44 (1955).
46 Comm'n on Foreign Economic Policy, Staff Papers 250 (1954).




"It is proposed," he said, "that a policy be adopted by the Congress to
assist and promote necessary adjustments by companies, workers, and
communities whenever injury results from increases in imports traceable
to tariff changes."'48 With national power to make tariff reductions and
to provide for the national well-being by aiding the economies of friendly
nations should go national responsibility for alleviating the adverse
effects of such policies.
In either event, it would seem that the national interest is involved,
the interest of the American public taken as a whole. In the one case,
national security is at issue and must be protected; in the other, the
economic viability of important parts of the national economy is involved
and should also get protection. There is no real need for the two aspects
of national interest to be in conflict. Neither the State Department nor
Congress has faced up to the full problem; nor, for that matter, did the
Commission on Foreign Economic Policy. Our foreign aid programs
operate, to a large extent, as subsidies to American export industries. Is
it fair or realistic to expect the textile industry of the United States, an
industry in relatively weak condition, to shoulder the bulk of the burden
of solving the Japanese problem? Admitting that Japan must trade and
trade with the United States is not a solution to a problem: It is, rather,
an invitation to the responsible authorities of the federal government
to tackle all aspects of the question of international trade.
"'Ibid., at 55.
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